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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has faced
relatively few major changes in its enabling statu tel during the last
sixty years. Its procedures largely have been preserved since New
Deal days. More particularly, judicial review of FCC action has
changed little since the adoption, over three decades ago, of general title 28 procedures for review of rulemaking and other non... Professor of Law, New York Law School; Founding Director, Communications Media
Center. BA, 1966, Wesleyan University; J.D., 1969, Cornell University; LL.M., 1971, Columbia University; J.S.D., 1979, Columbia University. Particular thanks are due to Mr.
Fredrik Cederqvist for his help in researching this piece, and to Daniel Goldfisher for his
assistance in editing it.
I Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, §§ I, 4-5, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(codified at 47 U.S.c. §§ 151, 154-155).
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licensing decisions. 2
The Communications Act's provisions for judicial review thus
appear to represent fragments from past administrative law, especially with regard to the sometimes vague and often unjustified distinction between its procedures for review of licensing decisions
and those for all other decisions, in particular those governing
rulemaking proceedings. With the advent of the so-called "information superhighway," and tentative movement toward amendment of the Communications Act, 3 the time might be ripe to refine
and rationalize the FCC's appellate procedure. The past system
seems to have worked reasonably well, however, despite its inconsistencies and other warts.
To date, no secondary literature has addressed judicial review
of FCC action in any detail. Because of increasing pressure for
changes to the Commission's organic act, a brief review of this
somewhat dry area may be useful. Moreover, appellate procedure
is a difficult area for many FCC practitioners, partially because they
encounter it so rarely. To begin with, it will be helpful to place the
FCC's situation in context with general federal procedures for judicial review.

I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTION
.IN GENERAL

Unlike some state systems, the federal judicial system has no
general common law judicial review of administrative action. This
is not to say, however, that all appeals must have a direct statutory
basis. As discussed below,4 other forms of indirect judicial review
are available, although they rarely form the basis of review of FCC
action. Nevertheless, some form of statute governs most agency review, including virtually every challenge to the Commission's actions. There are several forms of statutory judicial review in the
federal system.
2 Communcations Act Amendments of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-554, § 14, 66 Stat. 711,
718-20 (1952) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1988), to include by reference the provisions of
chapter 158 of title 28).
3 After a bruising battle over the provisions of the 103d Congress' comprehensive communications reform legislation, its sponsor and then chairman of the Senate Commerce
Committee, Sen. Ernest Hollings, ultimately withdrew the contentious reform bill, the
Communications Act of 1994, 1994 S. 1822, 103 S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). See
Nicholas W. Allard, Must Carry and the Courts: Bleak House, the Seque~ 13 CARoozo ARTS &
ENT. LJ. 139, 145 n.19 (1994). Senator Larry Pressler, the new chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee, is pushing for reform legislation to be passed early in the 104th
Congress' tenure. SeeJohn Rendleman, More Specifics Included in Latest Tekcom-Reform Propos~ COMMUNICATlONSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 4; Communications: Pressler, Fields Outline New
Communications Bill to Governors, WASH. INSIDER (BNA),Jan. 31, 1995.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 6-9.
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First, an agency's enabling statute may specify a procedure for,
as well as a standard of, review. Most commonly it is older agency
enabling statutes, including the Communications Act, that contain
such agency-specific provisions.
Second, an enabling act may incorporate a general statutory
review procedure by reference. A common one, found in the
Communications Act, is chapter 158 of title 28. 5
Third, general statutes authorize both traditional and modern
forms of "nonstatutory" relief. 6 For example, injunctive and declaratory relief may be available where no statutory remedy exists. 7
In addition, some of the traditional "great prerogative writs" may
apply.
As their name implies, the writs were within the sovereign's
discretion in exercising its prerogative powers over its courts. In
the context of modern administrative law, the two most important
writs are mandamus and certiorari. The former allows a court to
require an administrative official to perform a non-discretionary
action-for example, to issue a previously-approved license or certificate. s The Mandamus and Venue Act of 19629 resolved most
questions regarding the applicability of federal mandamus. By
contrast, certiorari directs an inferior tribunal-including an administrative agency-to transmit the record of a proceeding to a
higher court for review. State courts use both mandamus and certiorari more intensively than do federal courts, since most states
have relatively underdeveloped systems for judicial review.
Despite its name and scope, the Administrative Procedure
ActIO ("APA") does not create any right to judicial reviewY Sec28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (referred to in 47 U.S.C. § 402(a)).
These procedures are "nonstatutory" in the sense that-unlike the types of statutes
discussed above-their details are not set out by law. Nevertheless, of course, their existence and applicability are defined by statute.
To a limited extent, of course, actions for damages function as a type of judicial review, since they allow a court to pass upon the legal validity of an agency's action and to
impose the indirect sanction of monetary damages. Because these actions cannot per se
change an agency's policy and because they are subject to the vagaries of sovereign immunity, however, they provide a relatively limited remedy.
7 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8 Indeed, the availability of mandamus reaches back as far as Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), which recognized its existence while refusing on other
grounds to issue an order to deliver ajudicial commission.
9 Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (inserting 28 U.S.c. § 1361).
10 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). The sections governingjudichi.1 review are 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
11 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The original 1947 Attorney General's manual on the APA stated that § 701 et seq. "not only does not supersede special statutory review
proceedings, but also generally leaves the mechanics of judicial review to be governed by
other statutes and by judicial rules." ATTORNEY GENERAL TOM C. CLARK, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
5
6
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tion 702 expressly states that a party may secure judicial review if
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute. ... "12 The statute then sets forth procedures for
judicial review authorized by-but not specified in sufficient detail
within-other statutes.
In addition, both general and local rules implement statutory
review mechanisms. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
("FRAP") set forth relatively specific procedural provisions for the
Courts of Appeals. 13 The Supreme Court promulgates and amends
the FRAP pursuant to its own statutory authority.14 In addition,
each circuit court may adopt local "housekeeping" rules, as long as
the rules do not conflict with title 28 or the FRAP.15
Finally, the justiciability doctrines derived from constitutional
litigation-e.g., standing, ripeness, mootness-naturally apply to
review of administrative actions. They usually do not playa major
role in administrative litigation, however, because the status of a
formal agency "case" generally is clear. If an agency has followed
its statute and rules on a proceeding, usually there is little question
whether its action is moot, not ripe, etc. To the extent that justiciability questions do arise, the issue generally involves whether
the action constitutes a "final order."
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FCC ACTIONS-IN GENERAL
Virtually all challenges to Commission action arise under two
provisions of the Communications Act, each of which provides for
review at the circuit court level. The first, section 402(b),16 is
agency-specific, and governs appeals solely from licensing decisions; these matters are cognizable exclusively in the District of Columbia Circuit.
Acr 93 (1947), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK: STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS 159 (2d ed.
1992) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL].
12 5 U.S.c. § 702 (emphasis added).
13 These provisions govern civil and criminal cases, as well as judicial review of administrative action. This discussion deals only with the FRAP's application to agency cases.
14 28 U.S.c. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Hobbs Administrative Orders
Act was partially a product of the concern over reform of the administrative agencies after
World War II, which also led to the Administrative Procedure Act and the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 11.
The Congress need not approve the FRAP explicitly. While proposed amendments
must be submitted to the Congress, they automatically take effect if, after ninety days, Congress does not disapprove them, which it rarely does.
15 For example, the District of Columbia Circuit Rules ("D.C. CIR. R.") specifically state
that they are "consistent with" the FRAP. D.C. CIR. R. 1.
16 47 U.S.c. § 402(b) (1988).
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The second, section 402(a),17 incorporates by reference chapter 158 of title 28, and encompasses all other FCC actions, includingrulemaking proceedings, policy statements, and complaints.
These cases may be heard in any circuit in which a petitioner can
establish venue. As a rough generalization, review of any FCC formal action other than a licensing decision occurs pursuant to section 402(a).
By their terms, the two provisions thus are "mutually exclusive." As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "appeals from orders of
the Commission in exercising its 'licensing powers' must be taken
to the District of Columbia Circuit. All other orders fall within the
general coverage of [section] 402(a). Sections 402(a) and (b) are
mutually exclusive."18
Some confusion results where a moving party ~eeks review of
both a licensing decision and a rulemaking proceeding. For example, in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,I9 a broadcaster sought increased coverage for its station as well as an amendment of the
rules governing other stations' coverage. Hubbard filed its proceeding in the Eighth Circuit pursuant to section 402(a) on the
theory that its appeal involved a rulemaking proceeding. The
Eighth Circuit held that where a substantial licensing question also
was involved, a case presumptively should go to the D.C. Circuit,
noting that:
[the] FCC's denial of Hubbard's "package" of applications was,
as a matter of substance, the exercise by [the] FCC of its "radiolicensing power" re.vie~~ble under section 402 (b) ; further, that
to permit Hubbard to split off part of the "package" in a transparent attempt to obtain jurisdiction in a forum other than the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. " . would frustrate
the clear intent of Congress that judicial review of all cases involving FCC's "radio-licensing power" be limited to [that
court].20

a

As discussed below,21 review of FCC action also is subject to
the FRAP and the relevant circuit court rules. While the D.C. Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction makes it the relevant court in alilicensing cases, many rulemaking and other matters also end up in the
D.C. Circuit. Geographically, it is the closest of the Courts of Ap-

17

47 U.S.c. § 402(a).
Cook, Inc. v. United States, 394 F.2d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1968) (footnote and citation
omitted).
19 684 F.2d 594 (8th Cir.'1982).
20 [d. at 596-97.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 63-101.
18
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peals to the FCC. Until recently,22 this made it an easy target for
races to the courthouse. Although this consideration is largely irrelevant today because of changes in venue statutes,23 some litigants still prefer the D.C. Circuit over other Courts of Appeal,
because of its perceived "pro-regulatory" jurisprudence-which
may have waned somewhat in recent years.
Many aspects of section 402(b) appeals and 402(a) petitions
for review are identical, under both the FRAP and D.C. Circuit
Rules. In the interest of brevity, the following discussion cross-references those rules and doctrines of sections 402(b) and 402(a)
that are identical.
In addition, some challenges to Commission decisions may be
brought before district courts for injunctive or other relief. 24
Moreover, the Communications Act allows direct actions in district
court against common carriers, as opposed to broadcasters; section
20625 allows a district court to award damages and attorneys' fees
for violation of the Communications Act common carrier provisions. By definition, this section does not apply to broadcasters or
cable operators.
Finally, comparatively few justiciability problems arise, particularly under section 402 (b). Although there has been surprisingly
little discussion, most observers seem to assume that the relatively
relaxed standing requirements for intervention in FCC broadcast
licensing proceedings26 also apply to appeals of both licensing and
rulemaking decisions. 27 Financially affected firms, citizens groups,
and others have little difficulty in meeting standing requirements
on appeal. To the extent that issues regarding justiciability arise,
they usually question the existence of a "final order," as discussed
below. 28

III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FCC LICENSING DECISIONS
Sections 402(a) and 402(b) are discussed separately because
See infra text accompanying notes 124-126.
See infra text accompanying notes 119-120.
24 For example, in Writers Guild of America, West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal.
1976), vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), ceTt. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980),
22
23

the district court held that quasi-formal pressure by the Commission-and particularly its
chairperson-for broadcasters to adopt a "family viewing policy" violated the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs first should have presented their
claims to the FCC, and the matter did not go any further.
25 The statute allows damages for "any act, matter, or thing in this chapter [Tide II]
prohibited or declared to be unlawful .... "
26 See infra text accompanying notes 85-89, 129.
27 E.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1000 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 39-42.
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they differ significantly in many respects. Many statutes and rules,
however, apply to both-e.g., provisions as to briefs and appendices. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit, where many section 402(a) appeals ultimately are heard, treats the two types of proceedings
identically. Similarities are noted as applicable.
A.

Appealable Actions

Section 402(b) applies only to appeals from the FCC. It governs virtually any Commission decision relating to a broadcast or
other license to transmit over the air. It applies not just to licenses,
but also to construction permits, the Commission's initial authorization to build a station before application for a final license. 29
Moreover, section 402(b) does not restrict appeals to applicants for
a construction permit or license. Instead, it gives a laundry list of
licensing decisions that parties are entitled to appeal:
(1) By any applicant for a construction permit or station license, whose application is denied by the Commission.
(2) By any applicant for the renewal or modification of any
such instrument of authorization whose application is denied by
the Commission.
(3) By any party to an application for authority to transfer, assign, or dispose of any such instrument of authorization, or any
rights thereunder, whose application is denied by the
Commission.
(4) By any applicant for the permit required by [47 U.S.C.
§ 325] whose application has been denied by the Commission,
or by any permittee under said section whose permit has been
revoked by the Commission.
(5) By the holder of any construction permit or station license
which has been modified or revoked by the Commission.
(6) By any other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected by any order of the Commission granting or
denying any application described in paragraphs (1) to (4) of
this subsection.
(7) By any person upon whom an order to cease and desist has
been served under [47 U.s.C. § 312].
(8) By any radio operator whose license has been suspended by
the Commission. 30

Although section 402(b) may appear only to authorize appeals
29 As discussed later, grant of a construction permit is the first step toward securing a
license. Only after an applicant has built a station to satisfy the requirements in its construction permit may it apply for a final "covering license."
30 47 U.S.c. § 402(b).
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by applicants denied construction permits or licenses, it allows a
number of other parties to seek judicial review. The language in
paragraph 6 about "any person ... aggrieved" allows appeals by
parties adversely affected by the Commission's actions, thus permitting appeals by many parties other than applicants, including those
filing competing applications or petitions to deny. Nearly any
party with standing before the Commission 31 may invoke section
402(b) to appeal the grant or denial of a construction permit or a
license.
Although the Courts of Appeals tend to take a rather relaxed
view of standing, they require a party to have participated in an
agency's pr:oceedings in order to appeal. 32 This issue arises most
commonly in rulemaking proceedings; courts expect parties to participate in rulemaking, since considerably less effort is necessary to
file comments than to enter into a full-blown licensing hearing.
Just as the Courts of Appe,als seem to use the final order rule as 'a
substitute for the traditional justiciability doctrine, they use prior
participation as a non-constitutional substitute for standing
requirements. 33
'
B.

Exclusive Review'by D.C. Circuit

Perhaps section 402(b) 's most significant aspect is that.it restricts review to the D.C. Circuit. Although the reasoning behind
this provision may be lost in history, the apparent goal was to centralize judicial review of a then "new technology." Former Ch~ef
Justice Taft-who presided over the: Supreme Court after the enactmen t of the Radio Act of 192734-once complained that:
Interpreting the law on this subject is something like trying to
interpret the law of the occult. It seems like dealing with something supernatural. I want to put it off as long as possible in the
hope that it becomes more understandable before the court
passes on the questions involved. 35

The need for this type of de facto specialized court is less than clear
today. To be sure, the D.C. Circuit has developed a formidable
amount of expertise in communications, and particularly broad31
32
33
34

See infra text accompanying note 129.

,

E.g., Sierra Club v. United States Regulatory Comm'n, 825 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987).
E.g., ACLU v. FCC, 774 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 1985); Sierra Club, 825 F.2d 1356.

Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162.
CLARENCE C. DILL, RADIO LAw 1-2 (1938). The Court's attitude does not seem to
have changed dramatically over the years, as evidenced by its reluctance to make decisions
in the area of high-technology-and particularly communications-law and policy. See
infra text accompanying notes 146-151.
35

1995]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FCC ACTION

325

casting, cases. But other Courts of Appeals also have skills in this
area. Petitions for review of rulemakings increasingly have ended
up in other circuits under section 402(a). Most important, cases
involving "new media" such as cable television have been brought
in a number of circuits. Nevertheless, abandonment of the Communications Act's dedication of broadcast-related appeals to the
D.C. Circuit seems unlikely to change in the near future. 36

C.

Filing Procedures under Section 402(b)

Under sect;ion 402 (b), the filing of a "notice of appeal" initiates review. A notice is a comparatively simple document. It need
include only a "concise statement" of the "nature of the proceedings as to which the appeal is takt;n" and "the' reasons on which the
appellant intends to rely," as well as "proof of service of a true copy
of said notice and statement upon the Commission."37 Service
upon "interested parties" is required within five days after filing of
the notice of appeal. 38 A notice of appeal usually is extremely
short-usually only one or two pages-and phrased in very conclusory terms. "Fact pleading" is not required.
.
In licensing cases, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty
days of the Commission's release of "public notice," which constitutes a "final order."39 As with most deadlines for filing appeals,
the deadline is jurisdictional, and cannot be extended by either the
Commission or a reviewing court. 4O A "public notice" is not just a
press release,41 which the Commission also publishes on a regular
basis. It is' a short, one or two page descriptive document explaining the agency's action and rationale. As discussed later,42 in many
cases issuance of a public notice establishes the deadline for an
appeal.
Although the FCC normally publishes a dec;:ision near the time
it issues a public notice, in some situations there may be a delay
between the latter and the former, particularly if a case is controversial and preparation of a consensus opinion takes time. If a decision is not released within thirty days of a public notice's
issuance, an appellant may have to file a notice of appeal without
36 Randall Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1003
(1991) (suggesting that specialized courts have fallen out of favor with Congress).
37 47 U.S.C. § 402(c).
.
38 47 U.S.c. § 402(d).
39 47 U.S.C. § 402(c).
40 California Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped v. FCC, 833 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir.
1988); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1987).
41 Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
42 See infra text accompanying note 49.
.
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having the full text of an action. Due to the notice of appeal's
general nature, this usually is not a major problem. If the full text
of the decision differs substantially from the public notice, however, an appellant can protect herself by filing an additional notice
of appeal; the courts allow multiple notices of appeal from separate
FCC documents. 43

D.

Requirement of a "Final Order"

Although not by their own terms, both sections 402(a) and
402 (b) allow appellate proceedings only from a "final order" of the
Commission. Both provisions use the term "orders," rather than
"final orders." As incorporated by reference in section 402(a),
however, title 28 uses the "final order" language,44 and the courts
consistently have interpreted "order" in section 402(b) to mean "final order."
A final order usually is clear; if no further administrative proceedings are available and the action will affect a party, there is
little room for confusion. In some cases, however, the status· of a
proceeding is less than clear. 45
1.

Premature Filings

First, there may be some question as to whether the Commission's decision actually will have an affect on the appealing firm.
This question also may implicate ripeness questions; ripeness and
the final order doctrine are quite similar, since both focus on
whether there is an immediate impact on the party that is seeking
review. Courts thus often treat the issues together, and often reach
identical conclusions. 46
This result stems from courts' being fairly realistic about and
receptive to claims that FCC action will have an impact on a party.
43 In petitions for review the Commission has made issuance of a public notice the
"effective date" of an action in order to facilitate identifying the deadline. See infra text
accompanying notes 106-107, 122.
44 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1988).
45 For a general discussion of the final order rule, see Romualdo P. Eclaves, Annotation, ~at Constitutes Agent)' "Action, " "Order, " "Decision, " "Final Order, " "Final Decision, .. or the
Like, Within Meaning 0/ Federal Statutes Authorizing Judicial Review 0/ Administrative ActionSupreme Court Cases, 47 L. Ed. 2d 843 (1975).
46 For example, in Office a/Communication a/United Church a/Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 813
(D.C. Cir. 1990), the court had before it the Commission's denial of a rulemaking petition
to reinstate the traditional "anti-trafficking" policy, a rule preventing the buyer of a broadcast station from selling it within three years of its acquisition. The court held that the
FCC's action was final, even though the agency had reached an identical conclusion in
prior proceedings several years before, and that the issue was ripe since the Commission
had made its position clear. [d. at 816-17.
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In the early case of Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 47
the Supreme Court held that the Commission's adoption of rules
regulating network-affiliate relationships was sufficiently final-as
well as ripe-to constitute a final order. The Court specifically reo:jected the notion that CBS needed to wait until the Commission
actually enforced the rules against the affiliates. The Court noted:
If a licensee renews his contract, the regulations ... authorize
the Commission to cancel his license. In a proceeding for revocation or cancellation of a license, the decisive question is
whether the station, by entering into a contract, has forfeited its
right to a license as the regulations prescribe. It is the signing of
the contract which, by virtue of the regulations alone, has legal
consequences to the stations and to appellant. . .. If an administrative order has that" effect it is reviewable and it does not
cease to be so merely because it is not certain whether the Commission will institute proceedings to enforce the penalty incurred under its regulations for non-compliance. 48

Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that the Commission's
adoption of a rule by a formal vote and issuance of a news release-but not a public notice-constituted a final order. 49 The
court emphasized that "[t]he action taken at [the FCC public]
meeting was regarded by all the participants as final."50 Where the
Commission issues a series of orders-as is not uncommon in hotly
contested adjudications or rulemakings-the only safe approach
may be to file against every order, and then let the reviewing court
ultimately decide which one ~as .final. This strategy is aided by
some courts' willingness to allow filing against the last order to
include a challenge to all prior orders, even if they might be considered final. 51
Nevertheless, a decision can have a substantial effect upon a
partY's procedural status and yet not be considered final. For example, where an order extended the filing deadline for new frequencies, it increased the number of competing applicants; it was
not deemed final, however, since judicial review of the ultimate

a

316 U.S. 407, 417 (1942).
Id. at 417-18.
49 lIT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980).
sOld. at 1204.
51 See, e.g., ACLU v. FCC, 486 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that "even though
during the proceeding the Commission intermittently issued several orders, each of which
if considered alone might be considered final, but all of which preceded the ultimate order[,] ... the statute reasonably construed authorizes a petition'for review to be filed within
sixty days from the date of the Commission's 'final order' ... .").
47
48
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license grant would be available. 52
2.

"Negative Order" Rule

Second, another problem area in the past involved "negative
orders," Commission decisions not to take any action on a ma~ter.
To a large extent, the confusion seems to have arisen from reasoning by analogy to grants of m~ndamus.. The courts failed to distinguish betweeninactipn reflecting an agency's discretion, and
failure to decide a bona fide controversy..
The Supreme Court largely put an end to the negative order
doctrine in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States. 53 In that case a
telephone company 'petitioned for review of a Commission order
finding it to be.an interstate carrier under the "control" of the New
York Telephone Company, and thus pot subject to the exemption
from federal common carrier regulation for intrastate carriers.
The Court held that the FCC's order reclassifying the company as
interstate was not merely a refusal to take discretionary action, but
rather a decision with immediate legal consequences, such as the
filing of complex reports and forms. 54
.
Although the negative order doctrine still occasionally crops
up in FCC appeals, most courts reject it. For example, the Sev~nth
Circuit has held that an order denying reply. time under the fairness doctrine55 was final, since it effectively defeated the complainant's ability to secure reply time. 56
3. . Timing Issues'
Although the courts have become increasingly realistic in defining "final order," some degree of uncertainty still exists, creating
difficulty for litigants in deciding when to seek judicial review. Several problems regarding timing exist.
'First, a party may file after the Commission appears to have
taken a final action. For example, in Microwave Communications,
Little Rock Television Co. v. FCC, 646 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1981).
307 U.S. 125 (1939).
54 Id. at 142-44.
55 The fairness doctrine required broadcast licensees to serve the public interest by
covering controversial issues in the community, and also to provide balanced coverage of
those issues. See generally Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(sustaining the FCC's order repealing the doctrine upon its finding that the doctrine did
not serve the public interest due to its chilling effect on speech), cert. denied, 493 U.S. lO19
(1990).
56 Maier v. FCC, 735 F.~d 220 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Posner dissented on the ground,
inter alia, that the Commission's denial of a complaint was in the nature of prosecutorial
discretion-a position not derived from the negative order doctrine. Ill. at 237-39.
52

53
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Inc. v. FCC,57 MCI filed a petition for review of a Commission
rulemaking proceeding. MCI filed more than sixty days after an
informal announcement of the agency's action, but less than sixty
days after the Commission's order denying rehearing. The D.C.
Circuit held that the petition was timely, reasoning that because
"administrative reconsideration was timely sought, the filing period
was extended to the sixtieth day after 'public notice was given' of
the Commission's opinion and order ... denying rehearing."58
On the other hand, courts are not sympathetic to parties'
jumping the gun and filing premature appellate proceedings. The
problem is not with filing after the sixty day "window," but rather
that the petition is fil.ed before that window even opens. In these
types of cases, the D.C. Circuit consistently holds that appeals filed
before a final order are untimely, even though technically they
come within sixty days of issuance of a final order. 59
Related problems arise when the FCC delays in issuing the final text of a decision. Although it may be difficult to state the
grounds of an appeal without a textual decision in hand, it is wise
to file a notice of appeal from a public notice-not a news release-if a window is about to close and the Commission has not
released a final order. A party always can file a later notice of appeal from the text of the order. Some complicated cases with multiple orders thus generate several notices of appeal, because of the
uncertainty involved.
The thirty and sixty day filing windows are jurisdictional in nature and may not be extended by either the Commission or a
court. 60 Failure to make' a timely filing results in dismissal of an
appeal. 61 When in doubt as to the existence of a final order, it thus
is wise to file.
Moreover, there is inherent confusion as to the timing of an
appeal, since section 402 (b) has a filing period of only thirty days,
while section 402(a) allows sixty.62 It is easy to assume that time is
515 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 389.
59 See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1985); North Am.
Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 751 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1984).
60 See supra text accompanying notes 112-114.
61 E.g., Waterway Communications Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 851 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In
that case, the appellant filed a "petition for review" (actually a notice of appeal) challenging the Commission's failure to hold a hearing regarding a grant of licenses to a competitor for marine telephone service. As luck would have it, the appeal was filed be/UTe the
grant of licenses to appellant's competitors. It thus was untimely, because premature as to
the license grant. See also National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 760 F.2d 1297, 1298
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
62 28 U.S.C. § 2344.
57
58

330

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT·

[Vol. 13:317

not of the essence for a notice of appeal-with obviously embarrassing results. Even where deadlines are not at issue, experienced
practitioners routinely caption notices of appeal as petitions for review, and vice versa.
E.

Procedure on Judicial Review

Many issues in this area are identical for sections 402(a) and
402(b). In most cases the statutory requirements are the same, and
the FRAP and the D.C. Circuit Rules apply identically.

1.

Motions, Record, and Appendices

Mter a notice of appeal or petition for review has been filed in
the D.C. Circuit, the first step is to file a "docketing statement."63
This gives general information about the case and the parties, on a
form supplied by the Clerk of the Court. 64
.
The next step commonly is motions by the parties or otherse.g., motions to strike a notice of appeal or petitions to intervene.
While the FRAP do not have any general provisions as to motions,
the D.C. Circuit's rules are quite extensive. Motions and petitions
may not be longer than twenty pages, with replies limited to ten
pages. 65 Both page and print size are specified. 66 The pleading
cycle is on a fast track, with responses to motions due within seven
d ays67 and replies to responses within three days thereafter. 68 The
Clerk of the Court has authority to dispose of "procedural
motions. "69
Under the FRAP, the first motion or bnef filed must contain a
"corporate disclosure statement,'" which informs the court of the
parties and their relationships. The statement must identify "all
parent companies, subsidiaries (except wholly-owned subsidiaries),
and affiliates that have issued shares to the public."70 The D.C.
Circuit req:uires somewhat more information, including "the represented entity's general nature and purpose, insofar as relevant to
the litigation, and if the entity is unincorporated ... the names of
any members of the entity that have issued shares or debt securities
to the public. "71
63
64
65

D.C. CIR. R.
D.C. CIR. R.
D.C. CIR. R.
66 D.C. CIR. R.
67 D.C. CIR. R.
68 D.C. CIR. R.
69 D.C. CIR. R.
70 FED. R. APP.
71 D.C. CIR. R.

15(c).
15(c) (2).
27(a) (2).
27(a)(3); FED. R. App. P. 32.
27(c).
27(d).
27(e)(l).
P. 26.1.
26.1 (b).
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The Commission must file the record with the court within
five days of the notice of appeal. 72 In some cases the "record" is
quite short, in others monstrous. If the FCC has rejected a petition
to deny a broadcaster's license renewal, the record will consist
merely of the parties' pleadings and the Commission's usually brief
decision-a few hundred pages in total. On the other hand, the
record in a fully litigated comparative hearing often consists of extensive pleadings, transcripts of several dozen hearing days, and internal FCC appeals-often tens of thousands of pages.
For both petitions and notices of appeal, section 2112 of title
73
28 -which authorizes the Courts of Appeals to promulgate
rules 74_governs procedural aspects of the record. Most significantly, title 28 allows a "short form" filing procedure, which significantly reduces the size of the record on appeal. Section 2112
provides that rules of procedure "may authorize the agency .. : to
file in the court a certified list of the materials comprising the record and retain and hold for the court all such materials and transmit [them] to the court, when and as required by it . . . . "75
Generally, courts require submission of nothing more than the
"certified list of record items" until after the briefs have been
filed. 76 Rule 30 of the FRAP defers filing of briefs until twenty-one
days after the filing of the appellee's brief. 77 The parties initially
may file their briefs with page references to the original documents, and then substitute them with citations to the deferred appendix's pagination. 78 This can be somewhat expensive. Although
a party must provide the court ~th only seven copies of its initial
brief, it must file fifteen copies of its final briefwith the court. 79
The appellant or petitioner must serve upon opposing parties
a list of items which it proposes to include in the appendix; if the
appellee requests that other materials be included, the appellant
must do so at its expense~80 To ensure that appellees do not make
unreasonable requests, the FRAP allow each circuit court to "provide by local rule for the imposition of sanctions against attorneys
who unreasonably and vexatiously increase the costs of litigation
through the inclusion of unnecessary material in the appendix."81
72
73
74
75
76
77
. 78
79
80
81

47 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988).
Section 2112 governs both petitions for review and notices of appeal.
28 U.S.C. § 2112(a).
.
The D.C. Circuit also has adopted this provision. D.C. CiR. R 17(b).
FED. R APP. P. 30(c) .
Id.; D.C. CIR. R 30(c).
D.C. CIR. R 3l.
FED. R APP. P. 30(b).
Id.
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The D.C. Circuit has implemented this by providing that "[c]osts
shall not be awarded for unnecessary reproduction" and "appropriate sanctions will be imposed ... if the court finds counsel to have
been unreasonable in including such material. "82 The loss of costs
for a successful appellant is a significant deterrent.
The D.C. Circuit may waive the requirement of an appendix,83
but this is rare in FCC proceedings, since the parties usually have
ample resources. The Courts of Appeals always are free to take
notice of public' documents on file at the Commission or any other
agency.
2.

Intervention

Intervention is common in licensing proceedings, which usually involve disputes between competing operators or petitions by
citizens groups to deny license renewals. If a competitor or a petitioner files an appeal, a licensee usually intervenes in order to protect its interests. Moreover, other entities involved in the
proceeding-e.g., competitors-also may wish to become parties
to the appeal. Although an amicus curiae brief in theory allows
these parties to be heard, it restricts some of their procedural
rights-most notably, their right to appellate argument. In addition, the D.C. Circuit generally does not allow individual parties to
file amicus briefs; it requires them to join with other parties having
similar interests. 84
An "interested party"85 may intervene by filing a "notice of intention to intervene" within thirty days after filing of the notice of
appeal. 86 The time frame thus runs behind the deadline for appeal; the triggering event is the filing of the notice of appeal, while
the window for filing a notice of appeal opens with the Commission's public notice. In theory, a third party could file a notice of
appeal after a motion to intervene.
Like the notice of appeal, the notice of intention to intervene
is a short pleading that may include highly conclusory statements.
Unlike most modern federal pleadings, however, it must be supported by a "verified statement showing the nature of the interest of
82
83
84
85

D.C. OR. R. 30(b).
D.C. OR. R. 30(d).
D.C. CIR. R. 29(d).
47 U.S.c. § 402(e) (1988). The statute defines "interested party" as "[a]ny person
who would be aggrieved or whose interest would be adversely affected by a reversal or
modification of the order of the Commission complained of .... " Id. This generally
includes all parties participating in the Commission's proceedings.
86 Id.
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such party .... "87 This is largely a formality, of course, andgenerally consists of a one-page affi,davit from an official within the intervening entity stating that he or she believes the statements in the
notice to be true.
This detail often is overlooked, and attracts motions to dismiss
or to strike-often merely as a form of harassment. Failure to verify a notice of intervention is not jurisdictional, however, unlike
failure to file a timely notice of appeal. It may be cured by an expeditious motion to file the required statement nunc pro tunc-a request that the D.C. Circuit routinely grants.
While title 28 does not contain any specific provisions as to
intervention, rule 15 of the FRAP covers the issue for section
402(a) cases. It requir~s a motion to intervene-not verifiedcontaining a "concise statement of the interest of the moving party
and the grounds upon which intervention is sought."88 As under
section 402 (e), it must be filed within thirty days of the petition for
review. 89
3.

Briefs and Oral Arguments

Under both sections402(a) and 402(b), briefs are fairly conventional. The FRAP specify general requirements as to size of paper and type, and require the covers of briefs for appellants to be
blue, for appellees red, for intervenors green, and for reply briefs
gray.90 They also set forth general requirements as to jurisdietional
statements and related matters. 91 An interesting 1993 amendment
requires a brief to state the "~tandard of review."92
The D.C. .Circuit's rules are somewhat more specific. A brief
must contain a "Certificate as to Parties, Rulings, and Related
Cases,"93 including the ce'rtificate as to corporate parties,94 as well
as a description of the agency proceeding under review95 and of
any related litigation before any court. 96 Excluding introductory
materials such as certificates, tables, and the like, principal briefs
may not be longer than 12,500 words, or, if prepared by typewriter,
fifty typewritten pages. Reply briefs are limited to 6,250 words or
87
88

Id. (emphasis added).
FED. R. APP. P. 15(d),
89 Id.
90 FED. R. APP. P. 32(a).
91 FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(2).
92 FED. R. APP. P. 28(a) (5).
93 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1).
94 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1)(A). See supra text accompanying notes 70-7l.
95 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1) (B).
96 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1) (C).
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twenty-five typewritten pages. 97 The D.C. Circuit seems to take its
page limitations seriously, "disfavor[ing]" motions that exceed the
page limits. 98
The FRAP also have general requirements as to oral arguments. 99 Among other grounds, a court may decline to hear argument if it believes that it can decide the case adequately on the
briefs.lOo Argument is fairly conventional, with the appellant's beginning and concluding the argument. IOI
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF OTHER FCC ACTIONS
As noted above, section 402(a) provides that appeals of Commission decisions in proceedings other than licensing cases are
governed by chapter 158 of title 28.102 Section 2342(1) applies to
all FCC "final orders" other than those in licensing cases. It thus is
the primary review mechanism for rulemaking actions, policy statements, declaratory rulings, and a wide variety of other decisions.
As noted, there are differences and similarities between review
under section 402(a) and 402(b). To begin with, the basic nomenclature differs. A section 402(a) proceeding is initiated through a
"petition for review" rather than a "notice of appeal."103
Even seasoned practitioners often miscaption a "notice" as a
"petition," and vice versa. Aside from problems with the relevant
filing period, this type of mistake normally makes no substantial
difference, and a reviewing court usually ignores it. Nevertheless,
it shows the need for thought in filing an appeal from FCC actions.
Section 402(a) has a more generous filing deadline than SeCtion 402 (b)-sixty rather than thirty days. Under title 28, "[a]ny
party aggrieved by [an agency's] final order may ... file a petition
to review the order" in any Court of Appeals with proper venue.104
97 D.C. GIR. R. 28(d). Intervenors and amici curiae are limited to 8,750 words or 35
typewritten pages, and briefs must be filed within the time limitations described in FED. R.
APP. P. 29. D.C. CIR. R. 28(e) (3).
98 D.C. CIR. R. 27(h)(3) & D.C. GIR. R. 28(f) (1). "[Sjuch motions will be granted only
for extraordinarily compelling reasons." ld.
99 FED. R. APP. P. 34(a).
100 FED. R. APP. P. 34(a) (3).
101 FED. R. APP. P. 34(c).
102 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section also governs appeals from the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Transportation, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The general section 2342 review scheme first was enacted in 1966-thirty-two years
after § 402(b)-and is somewhat more in line with contemporary judicial review
procedures.
103 These terms are a bit obfuscatory, since a "petition for review" is the means of reviewing many agencies' adjudicatory as well as rulemaking decisions. The distinction at the
FCC largely is historical.
.
104 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1988). For a discussion as to timeliness of petitions for review in
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As noted below,105 the choice of venue may be quite broad under
section402(a), as opposed to the exclusive D.C. Circuit jurisdiction
under section 402 (b) .
As with section 402(b), the triggering event under section
402(a) is a "final order."106 This requirement may be met, however, by the Commission's issuance of a "public notice" as to an
action before release of its opinion. l07
A petition under section 402(a) may be somewhat general. It
need include only:

a concise statement of
(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which, review is
sought;
(2) the facts on which venue is based;
(3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and
(4) the relief prayed. lOS
The Clerk of the Court then serves a copy of the petition upon the
Commission and the Attorney General. 109
The petitioner need attach only copies of the agency actions
involved in its challenge. As under section 402(b), the Commission need not file all documents in the proceeding, but rather Just
a "certified list of record items."l1o Upon filing of a petition for
review, the moving party must file a copy, date-stamped by the
court clerk, with the Commission's General Counsel. III
As soon as the petition is filed, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to vacate stay orders or other temporary relief previously
granted,112 or, if there would otherwise be irreparable harm to the
petitioner, to issue such an order.1l 3 Temporary relief is effective
for a maximum of sixty days after the Commission's order, "pending the hearing on the application for the interlocutory injunction,
in which case the order of the Court of Appeals shall contain a
general, see Robin C. Lamer, Annotation, When Petition fur Review of Administrative Order
Under 28 USCS § 2344 is Timely Commenced, 84 ALR Fed. 369 (1987).
105 See infra text accompanying note 118.
106 28 U.S.C. § 2344.
107 ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of "public notices" and filing deadlines, see supra text accompanying notes 41-65.
108 28 U.S.c. § 2344.
109

[d.

See supra text accompanying note 76.
FCC General Rules of Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.13 (1993). This provision is designed to assist in situations with multiple petitions for review. See supra text
accompanying note 60.
112 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a) (1988).
113 28 U.S.C. § 2349(b).
110

111
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specific finding based on evidence" of irreparable damage. 114
Once a petition is filed, the Commission loses its power to issue
stays; only the reviewing court has jurisdiction over temporary
relief.
The FCC's enabling statute, and not title 28, specifies the substantive standard for judicial review under section 402 (a). The statute states merely that a Court of Appeals may "make and enter ...
a judgment determining the validity of, and enjoining, setting
aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the order of the
agency." 115
A Court of Appeals has a wide variety of procedural options
under title 28. If the Commission did not hold a hearing below,
the court may: (1) remand for a hearing, when a hearing is required by law; (2) "pass on the issues presented, when a hearing is
not required by law and it appears from the pleadings and affidavits ... that no genuine issue of material fact is presented"; or (3)
transfer the proceedings to an appropriate district court for a hearing, when a hearing is not required by law and a genuine issue of
material fact is presented. 116 The last option rarely is used. Similarly, a court may "adduce additional evidence" de novo if the court
finds that it is "material" and that there "were reasonable grounds
for failure" to introduce it before the FCC. 117
A.

Venue

As noted above, questions sometimes arise in cases involving
both licensing decisions and rulemaking issues. The quick answer
seems to be that the D.C. Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction governs,
and that both matters must be reviewed there-subject to section
402(b)'s thirty-day deadline.
Title 28 does not restrict review to the D.C. Circuit, but instead
sets venue in potentially any Court of Appeals, describing venue as
in "the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its
principal office, or, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."118 Unlike section 402(b), section
402(a) thus opens up a wide variety of potential fora. Until recently, this encouraged forum shopping. This was particularly
noteworthy during the 1980s, since the tension between regulation
114 Id. If the Court of Appeals finds that irreparable damage would result, it can extend
any temporary relief until its final decision.
115 28 U.S.c. § 2349(a).
116 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b) (1988).
117 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c).
118 28 U.S.c. § 2343 (1988).
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and deregulation added increasingly heavy ideological overlays to
Commission decisions. Courts of Appeals were perceived as having
"political" agendas-for example, the D.C. Circuit as a "liberal,"
pro-regulation court, and the Seventh Circuit as a "conservative,"
pro-marketplace court.
The availability of multiple venues inevitably creates problems
when two or more petitioners petition for review of the same order
in different Courts of Appeals. At one point, this resulted in a
straight race to the courthouse. Law firms had associates wait at
the Commission for release of a public notice or order, and then
race to the airport in attempt to be the first to file in a venue of
choice. This often resulted in creating venue in the D.C. Circuit,
the closest circuit court.
A 1988 amendment to title 28 rendered most of this totally
irrelevant, by prescribing procedures for choosing a court when
there are multiple petitions for review filed. 119 The courts encouraged the Commission to promulgate rules for determining the
earliest time at which a petition may be filed. 120 This gives all potential petitioners notice of when a petition can be filed, and thus
reduces the incentive to stage a race-even if that still were relevant under the 1988 legislation.
The Commission responded to the courts' invitation for uniform rules by pinning release of final orders to relatively easily ascertainable dates. The FCC did so by defining the "effective date"
of most non-licensing decisions. 121 This scheme naturally does not
and could not change the statutory definition of a "final order."
Nevertheless, the two concepts generally seem very similar; an order presumably is not "final" until it is "effective." In theory, a
Commission order might be final even if it did not meet the rules'
definition of "effective date"-as noted before, in situations where
courts accept the FCC's public announcement of a new policy as a
"final order." But this situation does not appear to have arisen.
Under the rules, the date of public riotice is 3:00 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time on the day after any of the dates below:
(1) For documents in notice and comment rule making proceedings[,] ... the date of publication in the Federal Register.
119 Act of Jan. 8,1988, Pub. L. No. 100-236, § 1(3),101 Stat. 1731, 1731-32 (amending
28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)).
120 lIT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980). In that case,
one petition for review was filed on the day that the Commission adopted its decision, and
two others when the full text was released. The court held that the first date governed,
since the agency's action was complete in substantive terms at that time.
121 FCC General Rules of Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1993).
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(2) For non-rulemaking documents released by the Commis-

sion or staff, whether or not published in the Federal Register, the
release date. A document is "released" by making the full text
available to the press and public in the Commission's Office of
Public Affairs. The release date appears on the face of the
document.
(3) For rule makings of particular applicability, if the rule making document is to be published in the Federal Register and the
Commission so states in its decision, the date of public notice
will commence on the day of the Federal Register publication
date. If the decision fails to specify Federal Register publication,
the date of public notice will commence on the release date,
even if the document is subsequently published in the Federal
Register. See Declaratory Ruling, 51 [Fed. Reg.] 23,059 Uune 25,
1986).
(4) If the full text of an action document is not to be released
by the Commission, but a descriptive document entitled "Public
Notice" describing the action is released, the date on which the
descriptive "Public Notice" is released.
(5) If a document is neither published in the Federal Register nor
released, and if a descriptive document entitled "Public Notice"
is not released, the date appearing on the document sent (e.g.,
mailed, telegraphed, etc.) to persons affected by the decision. 122
The FCC expressly reserves the right, however, to establish an earlier or later date in a particular case. Although it rarely does so, it
occasionally changes the date in order to ensure that the parties
and the public are informed adequately of a major rulemaking
action. 123
Although these rules previously would have left room for a
race to the courthouse, today such an effort has no value. The
1988 amendments effectively took away from the Courts of Appeals
any value of priority in filing.
Under section 2112,124 if an agency receives petitions for review in two or more Courts of Appeal, it must notify the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. In turn, the Panel "shall, by
means of random selection, designate one court of appeals . . . in
which the record is to be filed, and shall issue an order consolidating the petitions for review in 'that court of appeals."125 Being first
in time thus has little or no value today. Although the Courts of
Appeals presumably still retain their inherent power to transfer a
122
123
124

125

47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b).
[d.
28 U.S.c. § 2112(a)(3) (1988).
[d. (emphasis added).
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case for the convenience of the parties,126 in appellate cases there
usually are no compelling circumstances; after all, only an oral argument-rather than examination of witnesses or property-is
involved.
The same provisions as to filing of the record apply under section 402(a) as under section 402(b).127 The whole record thus
need not be filed with the brief; instead, the FCC files only a "certified list of record items," followed by ajoint appendix after filing of
the briefs.
As with section 402(b) proceedings, intervention is available in
section 402(a) appeals. Title 28 allows the Attorney General to intervene "as of right. "128 More generally, it allows any "party in interest" to appear if its "interests will be affected if an order of the
agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended."129 Since
there are virtually no cases under this provision, its interpretation
is unclear. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the relatively lenient type of standards under section 402(b) would apply,
at least to any party having filed comments in a rulemaking or
other proceeding at the Commission.

B.

Rehearing in Bane

Finally, in both section 402(a) and 402(b) cases, a losing party
before a threejudge panel may seek a rehearing in bane, before all
of the judges in a circuit. The filing must be made within fourteen
days after the threejudge panel's decision. I30 A party may initiate
this procedure by filing a "suggestion" of the "appropriateness of a
hearing or rehearing in banc."I3I A majority vote of all active
judges is required to grant a rehearing. 132 A "rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity
of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of
126 The venue provisions of chapter 158, 28 U.S.C. § 2343, are silent as to transfers for
the convenience of the parties. Section 1404 applies only to district courts. Neither provision, however, seems to negate the Courts of Appeals' traditional forum non conveniens
powers.
'
127 28 U.S.C. § 2346 specifies that the filing of the record is governed by § 2112(a)-the
same provision applicable to the record on appeal under § 402(b). .
128 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1988).
129 Id. The statute also specifies that "[c]ommunities, associations, corporations, firms,
and individuals, whose interests are affected by the order of the agency, may intervene in
any proceeding to review the order." Id. The difference between this clause and the provision in the same paragraph as to "parties in interest" is less than clear, and very well may be
non-existent.
ISO FED. R. APP. P. 35(c), 40(a).
lSI FED. R. APP. P. 35(b).
1S2 FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
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exceptional importance. "133 A rehearing in banc thus is an extremely rare form of relief to secure. Aside from its disfavored status, the extremely tight filing deadline of fourteen days makes it
logistically difficult.
If a party has lost before a threejudge panel and has been
unable to secure rehearing in banc, its only-albeit unlikely-remedy is a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

V.

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Under title 28, any "final judgment of the court of appeals" in
a section 402(a) proceeding is "subject to review by the Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari."134 A petitioner must file an application for a writ "within 45 days after entry of the order and within 90
days after entry of the judgment, as the case may be."135
A writ of certiorari, of course, is totally discretionary with the
Supreme Court. The Court's rules provide that:
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only when there
are special and important reasons therefor. The following ...
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a
decision in conflict with the decision of another United
States court of appeals on the same matter ... or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of
supervision.
(c) When a ... UnitedStates court of appeals has decided
an important question of federal law which has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided a federal question in a way that conflicts with applicable decisions of this Court}36

A petition for certiorari is relatively straightforward. The petitioner must file its application within ninety days of "entry of judgment" by the court beloW. I37 In addition to the usual tables and
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[d.

28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1988); 28 U.S.c. § 1254(1) (1988) (allowing the Supreme
Court to review a matter by certiorari "upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree").
135 28 U.S.c. § 2350(a).
136 SUP. CT. R. 10.
137 SUP. CT. R. 13.1. The Supreme Court's proposed revised rules add that petitions for
certiorari are timely when filed within the ninety day period "unless otherwise provided by
law," recognizing that Congress may modify that time period. Proposed Revised Rules of
134
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summaries, the petition must contain a "concise statement of the
case."138 If the petitioner is a corporation, the filing must include a
statement similar to the certificate required by the FRAP and D.C.
Circuit. 139 The petition must be served by mail on all parties tothe
proceeding below. 140
A respondent has thirty days from receipt of the petition in
which to file an opposing brief, which also must be served on all of
the parties below. l41 Both a petition and a reply brief are limited
to thirty printed or sixty-five typewritten pages, exclusive of index,
tables, and the like. 142
In the event that certiorari is granted, petitioner's brief on the
merits is due within forty-five days of the order, and a reply brief
within thirty days of the principal brief. 143 A deferred appendix is
available, as under the FRAP and D.C. Circuit Rules. l44 Briefs on
the merits by petitioner and respondent are limited to fifty typeset
or 110 typewritten pages, not including tables, summaries, etc. 145
The chances of securing a grant of certiorari, of course, are
quite slim. Aside from its normal reluctance to hear many cases,
the Court seems to shy away from high-technology cases in general,
and communications cases in particular. The situation thus may
not have changed too much from former Chief justice Taft's refusal to take radio cases.
Even when the Court grants certiorari, it often renders less
than comprehensive opinions. Perhaps the most striking example
of this phenomenon is the Prefer:red Communications146 saga.
In that case, Preferred brought suit under section 1983 147 challenging the constitutionality of Los Angeles' policy to award only
one cable television franchise in each geographic area, as well as
various City programming requirements. The district court disthe Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 13.1 (Mar. 13, 1995) (proposed effective July
3, 1995) [hereinafter Proposed Sup. Ct. R.].
138 SUP. CT. R. 14.1(g) (emphasis in original).
139 SUP. CT. R. 29.1; see supra text accompanying notes 70-71; see also Proposed Sup. Ct.
R. 29.6.
140 SUP. CT. R. 12.4; see also Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 12.6.
141 SUP. CT. R. 15.2. But see Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 15.3 (establishing a known-ta-all rule
by allowing respondents thirty days from the date that a petition "is placed on the docket").
142 SUP. CT. R. 33. But see Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 33.1 (requiring all documents to "be
prepared using professional typesetting" rather than typewriting except in cases provided
for under Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 33.2).
143 SUP. CT. R. 25.1 & .3.
144 SUP. CT. R. 26.4. But see Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 26.4 (stating that " [d]eferal of the joint
appendix is not favored").
145 SUP. CT. R. 24.3 & .4; SUP. CT. R. 33.3; see also Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 34.
146 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
147 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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missed the case, only to be reversed by the Ninth Circuit. 148 When
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, some observers thought that
it would define cable operators' First Amendment rights. 149 The
Court wrote an extremely brief opinion, however, noting that:
Respondent's proposed activities [building a cable system]
would seem to implicate First Amendment interests as do the
activities of wireless broadcasters, which were found to fall
within the ambit of the First Amendment. ... We do not think,
however, that it is desirable to express any more detaIled views
on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question
raised by respondent's complaint and the City's responses to it
without a fuller development of the disputed issues in the case.
We think that we may know more than we know now about how
the constitutional issues should be resolved when we know more
about the present [operation of cable systems].150
The Court therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision, remanding the case to the district court for a full trial. Mter a trial,
the district court concluded that some of the franchise provisions
were constitutionally suspect, but that Preferred had not shown
substantial monetary damages. In early 1994, the Ninth Circuit
once again reversed the district court and remanded the case for
further hearings as to the damages issue l51 -more than seven years
after the Court's decision.
A statistical comparison of the Court's willingness to review
communications as opposed to other cases is impossible. It seems
fair to conclude, however, that the Court is more receptive to cases
involving the constitutionality of federal statutes than of federal
rules or state statutes. In any event, a litigant's chances of a grant
of certiorari certainly are no greater in communications cases than
in the general run of cases-that is, virtually non-existent.
CONCLUSION

Judicial review of FCC action is a bit more complex than that
of other regulatory agencies, if only because of the Communica148 Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.
1985).
149 The Court had refused to do so in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). In
invalidating the FCC's "access" rules, the Court ruled solely on the statutory rather than
First Amendment questions raised by the Eighth Circuit.
150 476 U.S. at 494-95; see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993) (in which the Court remanded to the district court a constitutional challenge to the Must Carry provisions of the
Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1992).
151 Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994).
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tions Act's somewhat hoary procedures. The greatest difficulty lies
not in briefing or arguing a case, but rather in getting it into an
appellate court in the first place, for two reasons.
First, the dividing line between· "appeals" of licensing decisions
and "petitions for review" of other actions sometimes is less than
clear, and practitioners often do not take the time to determine
the proper procedure.
Second, it sometimes is difficult to identify the proper document on which to base judicial review, and thus the appropriate
timing of review. Concepts such as "final order" and the like continue to plague appellate practice, with no apparent administrative
relief in sight.
When an appeal or petition has been accepted in an appropriate court, the process becomes much easier. Title 28's general procedures usually govern, dictating the relatively familiar and
straightforward procedure for appendices, briefs, and other similar
matters.
After sixty years, the system seems largely to have sorted itself
out. But this only raises the question whether-in light of possible
substantive amendments to the Communications Act to accommodate new technologies-procedural changes are in order.
. At this relatively early point, no major changes appear to be
necessary. To be sure, developments such as "convergence" very
well may make obsolete the Communications Act's basic distinction between licensing and other decisions. But these substantive
trends still are too tentative to justify major procedural changes.
Despite the existence of some flaws and inconsistencies in the present system, it may make sense to leave it unchanged until the form
of substantive developments in emerging communications
solidifies.

